Applying economics in a hostile environment: the health sector  by Williams, A.
68Gac Sanit 2001; 15 (1): 68-73
OPINIÓN
Summary
In this paper we state that health economics is now amongst
the leaders in a «paradigm shift» in economics that needs to
spread as quickly as possible into the rest of the subject. This
conclusion is obtained from considering that economics can
be applied to topics that do not appear superficially to be eco-
nomic topics such as what is the best treatment for a natio-
nal health service to offer to a patient with a particular di-
sease.
Resumen
En este artículo se aportan razones para concluir que la eco-
nomía de la salud está entre las disciplinas que lideran el «cam-
bio de paradigma» en economía, el cual necesita extenderse
cuanto antes al resto de la economía. Esta conclusión se ob-
tiene a partir de considerar cómo la economía puede ser apli-
cada a temas que a primera vista no parecen económicos, como
puede ser intentar responder a cuál es el mejor tratamiento que
un sistema nacional de salud debería proporcionar a un paciente
con una enfermedad concreta.
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Topics and disciplines
T
hirty years ago (which looks to me like «since be-
fore most of you were born») I decided to dedi-
cate the rest of my professional career to per-
suading the medical profession and others
influential in the running of health care systems that eco-
nomics was a serious intellectual discipline which
could help them with the policy problems they faced,
and not just an annoying constraint that stopped them
from doing all the good things they wanted to do, both
at an individual and at a social level.
By «a serious intellectual discipline» I mean a sys-
tematic mode of thinking which has developed certain
concepts, and studied certain structural relationships,
which lead its practitioners to see the world in a distinctive
way, and to ask characteristic questions, and to requi-
re certain kinds of data which are then interpreted in a
characteristic way. Typical examples of these charac-
teristic questions are:
– What exactly are you trying to maximise? 
– What are the constraints? 
– What options are available?
– What will the consequences of each be at the mar-
gin?
– What will be the timing of these consequences? 
– Are the benefits likely to be worth the sacrifices? 
And the typical data that is regarded as appropria-
te for answering these questions will be quantitative rat-
her than qualitative, and in order to make things com-
mensurate, all valuations will be expressed in money
terms (which does not necessarily mean that they will
be market-generated values).
These characteristics of economics as a discipline
came from centuries of thinking about economic pro-
blems, that is, from economics as a topic. Typical eco-
nomic topics (or problems) are inflation, unemployment,
efficiency in the production and distribution of goods and
services, the incentive or disincentive effects of taxa-
tion, and so on. But each of these economic topics could
also be analysed from the viewpoint of other discipli-
nes. For instance, inflation could be seen as a moral
problem and viewed from an ethical standpoint, or as
a threat to democracy and analysed from the viewpoint
of political science, or as a sociological problem because
of its consequences for family structures, or as a legal
problem in the framing and enforcement of contracts,
and so on. The point I want to make is that there need
be no one-to-one relationship between a particular dis-
cipline and the problems it can be used to tackle. Just
as disciplines other than economics can usefully be ap-
plied to economic topics, so the discipline of economics
can be applied to topics that do not appear superficially
to be economic topics at all, such as what is the best
treatment for a national health service to offer to a pa-
tient with a particular disease! I will come back to that
controversial question later.
Positive and normative
But first of all I want to draw an important distinc-
tion between two types of economics: positive and nor-
mative. Positive economics seeks to establish what is
actually happening and where that will most likely lead
under various assumptions. It focuses on essentially fac-
tual matters (though sometimes a rather speculative
ones), the conclusions of which can be empirically tes-
ted to find out whether or not they are false. There is
much unresolved discussion as to whether the best test
of a positive analytical apparatus is the realism of its
assumptions, and/or the accuracy of its predictions,
and/or its generalisability, and/or its intuitive transparency
(the avoidance of the «black-box» approach). Norma-
tive economics seeks to go one step further, and re-
commend what is the best thing to do (given what we
understand from positive economics about underlying
relationships between policy instruments and policy tar-
gets). The test of a good normative analytical appara-
tus is a little different from that for a positive one, be-
cause we need to check that the assumed maximand
and the assumed constraints are indeed those that are
appropriate to the policy problem under investigation,
and that the policy instruments that are required are in
fact available, or could be available if desired. A good
predictive theory, on the other hand, need not contain
any variable that can be used by policy-makers to chan-
ge things.
One of the great problems within economics is the
way people slide unwittingly from positive to normati-
ve modes without even realising it. Consider the fun-
damental notion of «efficiency». Is it a positive concept
or a normative concept? It could be either. But when
someone shows that situation A is more «efficient» than
situation B, this is almost invariably interpreted as a re-
commendation to go for A rather than B. But this is only
valid if maximising efficiency (in the particular way in
which it is defined for purposes of economic analysis)
is actually what policymakers want to do. I will also re-
turn to this point later. All I am urging upon you at this
point is to examine carefully your own thinking and be-
haviour whenever you make the judgement that one si-
tuation is better than another situation, as opposed to
simply observing that they are different in certain res-
pects.
Doctors
So let me get back to my 30-year crusade to get pe-
ople running health care systems to take economics se-
riously as an intellectual discipline. The first major obs-
tacle I encountered was the dismissive assertion from
influential members of the medical profession that it
would be immoral for any clinician to take costs into ac-
count when deciding what treatment to recommend to
a patient, so the intrusion of hard-headed economics
into fine humanitarian areas of human endeavour such
as medicine was to be strenuously resisted on ethical
grounds, and would I kindly get lost! This was not a very
encouraging start. So I started unpicking the ethical ar-
gument that it is the doctor’s duty to do whatever is best
for the patient in front of him or her, no matter what the
cost. Here, initially, I perpetrated the sin that I just war-
ned you against, namely I confused the positive and the
normative. The doctors’ ethical argument is a normati-
ve assertion, but I tackled it in the first place by opera-
ting in the positive realm, observing what doctors ac-
tually do, with a view to demonstrating that they don’t
actually live up to their own ethical code. This was in
fact quite easy to do, because doctors have many res-
ponsibilities besides treating the patient in front of them
at any particular time. For instance, they will have other
patients waiting for their skill and attention, whose in-
terests they have to balance against those of the par-
ticular patient they are currently attending to. They have
to take time out from treating patients to keep up to date
with medical science. They may be engaged in rese-
arch intended to benefit future rather than current pa-
tients. They may be involved in the training of new doc-
tors. They have a practice to manage, staff to hire or
fire, financial matters to sort out. They also have their
personal and family lives to lead. So they are constantly
balancing the time and energy spent on each of these
activities one against another. In other words they are
considering the opportunity costs of each activity in terms
of the foregone benefits from the other activities. It is
a classic optimisation problem requiring equi-marginal
adjustments which will depend on what each individual
doctor is trying to maximise. But once there is more than
one competing activity, they cannot possibly be igno-
ring the costs of whatever time they spend with the pa-
tient in front of them, and all that economists are sa-
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ying is that if it is OK to consider opportunity costs with
respect to your own time, it must also be OK to consi-
der the opportunity costs with respect to all the other
scarce health care resources too (like hospital beds,
drugs, nursing staff, etc). But although showing that doc-
tors don’t behave according to their own supposed et-
hical code raises the suspicion that they don’t actually
believe in it, it does not address the issue of whether
that code was the appropriate ethical code in the first
place, and, if not, what ethical code should replace it.
That is the trap I initially fell into.
I rescued myself from it by arguing that the reason
why it would not be ethical to ignore the opportunity costs
of providing whatever is best for the particular patient
in front of the doctor at any one time, is because in a
resource-constrained system (and all systems are re-
source-constrained) any resources devoted to one pa-
tient are denied to other patients, whose health will suf-
fer as a consequence. So if the primary objective of a
health care system is to improve the health of a whole
population as much as possible, and if this is an ethi-
cal objective (which it clearly is), then again the equi-
marginal principle should apply, namely that you should
behave in such a way as to ensure that the foregone
health gain is the same for any redeployment of any scar-
ce resource, and this foregone health gain will always
be positive. This requires constant consideration of the
value of these opportunity costs to make sure that they
do not exceed the value of the benefits. The ethical po-
sition implied by the simple application of the equi-
marginal marginal principle is that a given health gain
should be regarded as of equal value no matter who
gets it, which is a strong egalitarian position about how
interpersonal comparisons of welfare should be made
in this context. If policy-makers wish to adopt some more
complex ethical position about distributional justice, this
can also be accommodated, but we shall always face
opportunity costs and tradeoffs, and it will never to et-
hical to ignore such costs and trade-offs. This is the et-
hical basis of the economists’ position, and it turns out
to provide an ethical platform to support what most doc-
tors actually do. Nominal adherence to the other code
is then best seen as a marketing slogan, designed to
enhance the confidence of patients in their doctors. After
all, people who ignore the consequences of their ac-
tions for innocent third parties are not acting ethically,
they are acting fanatically, and fanaticism has no place
in a humanitarian activity such as the provision of he-
alth care. 
So you will appreciate why it was that last year I got
a tremendous sense of achievement when the Medi-
cal Ethics Committee of the British Medical Association
declared1 that:
«Health professionals have an ethical duty to make
the best use of the available resources and this means
that hard decisions must be made. Whilst this is a much
broader issue than can be discussed thoroughly in this
document, it is clear that doctors are not obliged to
comply with patients’ requests for treatment when they
make inequitable demands on scarce resources».
Notice the key phrase «inequitable demands»,
which highlights the key role of distributive justice rat-
her than «efficiency» in this line of thinking.
Accountants
But long before emerging with some modest sense
of achievement from that battleground, I had run into
another minefield, again over the meaning of costs, this
time laid by accountants and finance officers in the he-
alth care system. This second, and rather more unex-
pected, group of opponents, objected to my assertion
that costs were sacrifices which would not necessarily
show up in money terms. This they said was simply naive
and unrealistic and typical of the kind of head-in-the-
clouds propositions for which academics were notorious.
They took the view that only money costs were real costs,
and that other so-called costs were either ephemeral
or irrelevant or both. Doctor’s time is a real cost, be-
cause the Health Service has to pay for it, but patients’
time is not a real cost, because it does not fall on any-
body’s budget, and since patients willingly give up their
time to get treatment it can’t be a relevant considera-
tion. They were not impressed by my argument that
money is merely an artifice designed to control people’s
access to real resources, and that we have to look behind
the «veil of money» to see what is really happening. They
flinched visibly when I pointed out that if it really was a
shortage of money that was holding us back, we could
easily print some, since paper and ink are both readily
available and very cheap. I have so far found this gulf
unbridgeable, and the only way forward I can see is to
reform the budgetary system in such a way that all «real
costs» (in an economists sense) do fall on somebody’s
budget, so that even accountants begin to see them as
«real costs». For instance, one of my favourite propo-
sals for health care reform is to introduce a charge for
the use of patients’ time. I think it would revolutionise
the way in which health care is provided. For most pa-
tients there are things they would rather be doing than
sitting around waiting to see a doctor, and they have
no desire to be in hospital any longer than is absolu-
tely necessary. I once suggested to a finance officer that
cost per case could be reduced by shortening length
of stay (especially when patients were being kept in over
a weekend because the doctor who could authorise their
discharge did not work on a Friday and would not be
in again until Monday). I was told that it was the extra
days at the end of a patient’s hospital stay when not
much was being done that enabled them to keep the
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cost-per-day down, and that if these low-cost days were
replaced by the high cost days generated by newly arri-
ved patients, costs-per-day would shoot up and it would
be impossible to balance the books. He thought a more
efficient change would be to get the primary care sec-
tor to provide the drugs required for patients immedia-
tely after discharge from hospital, instead of supplying
them from the hospital pharmacy, because although this
would be more risky for the patients and more costly
to the health service as a whole, it would get them off
his budget. Accountants’ ideas of what is efficient and
economists’ ideas of what is efficient are clearly poles
apart.
Unfortunately, while economists and accountants are
well aware of the great divide between us over whet-
her «costs» are real sacrifices or merely money outlays,
most members of the medical profession cannot tell the
difference between us. They then blame economists for
the defects in the financial system which economists
have been struggling to rectify. So I gave up dealing with
accountants and tackled the next problem, which was
to try to disabuse people of the idea that economists
are only interested in costs. I tried to persuade them
instead that we are interested in benefits as well, and
especially in how benefits are valued. 
Epidemiologists
This generated hostility from a new quarter, namely
the epidemiologists and clinical researchers, whose pro-
fessional lives were dedicated to the measurement of
so-called «hard endpoints» in health care, like survival,
or tumour size, or blood pressure, or some other bio-
medical indicator of disease deterioration or improve-
ment. I pointed out that, taking as the indicator of suc-
cess in a clinical trial a commonly used measure such
as the two-year survival rate, carried with it the follo-
wing value-judgements:
a) To survive for less than 2 years confers no be-
nefit.
b) Having survived for two years, further survival con-
fers no additional benefit.
c) It does not matter with what quality of life you sur-
vive.
d) The value of survival is the same for everybody.
Observation of the crudity of most of the conventional
benefit measures in health care has led economists to
champion a radically different concept, namely the qua-
lity-adjusted life year (or QALY). This is based on the
simple idea that if we can provide someone with an extra
year of health life expectancy, that should count as 1
unit. But if the best we can do is provide someone with
an extra year when they will have difficulty moving about
and be in some pain, then that should count as less than
1 unit. How much less than 1 will depend on how bad
it is. Suppose we set being dead as equal to zero, then
we should find out how people rated different health sta-
tes on a scale in which being healthy is rated at 1 and
being dead is rated at zero (allowing them to rate some
states as being worse than dead if they so wished, i.e.
to assign negative values to some very bad states). But
which people should we ask? The doctors and epide-
miologists said that we should ask the patients. But which
patients? The patients who are currently in the particular
health states, those who might find themselves in the
health states, or those who were in them in the past but
are now out of them again? On ethical grounds you might
argue that everyone who is affected by a decision to
provide (or not to provide) a particular treatment for a
particular group of patients has the right to have their
values considered. But in an interdependent resource-
constrained system every such decision potentially af-
fects everybody. And what about the taxpayers who put
up the money and made the sacrifices in other aspects
of their living standards, do they not have a right to be
heard too? Each of us as citizens has mixed motives.
As taxpayers, we want a reasonable set of priorities es-
tablished so that our money is not wasted on treatments
with high costs and little or no benefit, but when we are
ill we want the best that money will buy (provided it is
other people’s money, of course). So health economists
have advocated eliciting the values of a representati-
ve sample of the whole population, and then using the
mean or median values of that group of people to ge-
nerate the «quality-adjustments» in QALYs.
But how would these «socially-valued» QALYs then
be used? If the objective of health care were solely to
maximise the health of the population at large, then we
would measure the incremental cost per QALY for each
treatment and go for those that have the best cost-per-
QALY ratio. This line of thinking has led to the creation
of cost-per-QALY league tables, and the associated re-
commendation that in the face of budget limitations you
should start with the most cost-effective things and work
your way down the list until the money runs out. Only
in this way will population health be maximised. But if
policy-makers think that the health care system also has
important equity objectives as well, such as reducing
inequalities in people’s lifetime experience of health, they
will want to give extra weight to benefits that go to pe-
ople whose expected lifetime QALYs are low (such as
the permanently disabled, or those people with relati-
vely short life expectancy compared with the norm for
that society). This can be handled by devising equity
weights so that a given health gain is no longer regar-
ded as of equal value, no matter who gets it, but if dif-
ferential value depending on who gets it. Economic
analysis is capable of more sophistication than many
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people imagine.
But there is strong resistance from the clinical re-
search community to substituting these generic prefe-
rence-based measures of health for the specific indi-
cators they are accustomed to employing within clinical
trials and in the monitoring of treatments and the audit
of physicians’ competence. They resent the incursion
of economists (who they imagine are solely motivated
by a desire to cut costs) into benefit measurement and
valuation, where they are (rightly) seen as a very dan-
gerous threat to the hitherto unchallenged authority of
doctors in that territory. That earlier question («What is
hard-headed economics doing in a fine humanitarian
areas of human endeavour such as medicine?») is again
posed, but this time with increased vehemence. This
work on QALY measurement and valuation has got me
into more trouble than anything else I have ever done,
and the battle still rages fast and furious. But I gain com-
fort from knowing that I am right and they are wrong!!!
Welfarists
So for some respite from all of this aggravation I
sought comfort and support from within economics it-
self, and this is where I encountered my fourth and most
disheartening obstacle, namely the conventional wis-
dom of neo-classical welfare economics. According to
this, individuals are to be regarded as the sole judges
of their own welfare and nothing is to go into judgements
about social welfare except some aggregation of the wel-
fare of individuals. If you add to these two propositions
the further assertion that no interpersonal comparisons
of welfare are to be permitted (even though everyone
but economists makes them every day), then you have
the essence of the classical welfare economists man-
tra, which is that one social situation is better than anot-
her if and only if at least one person is better off and
no-one is worse off than in the starting position (wha-
tever that happens to be). Since there is virtually no cir-
cumstance in which a social change leaves nobody
worse off, this rather useless proposition got modified,
and instead says that if it were possible for the gainers
from any change to compensate the losers fully and still
have some gains left, then the move would be a social
improvement, even though the compensation is not ac-
tually paid. No attention is to be paid to who are the gai-
ners and who are the losers, nor to how unjust the star-
ting position might have been. So if the gainers are the
rich old, who might live a few extra years as the result
of some policy, and the losers are poor young teara-
ways who could be bribed into accepting a higher risk
of death to make this possible, then even though they
end up facing the extra risks without any compensation,
this is judged to be a social improvement. If this is in-
deed what economics is all about, then perhaps the doc-
tors were right to reject it as unethical. But fortunately
not all economists espouse this ethically unacceptable
welfarist philosophy, and very few European health eco-
nomists do. Indeed most European health economists
work within a «non-welfarist» frame of reference within
which the distribution of welfare within a society is to
count, as well as its sum total.
In health economics the two primary objectives of
policy are assumed to be to maximise population he-
alth and to reduce inequalities in the lifetime experien-
ce of health of the individuals who comprise that po-
pulation. Health should be measured in Quality Adjusted
Life Years, of course, and although it is well known that
the life expectancy of poor people is much lower than
that of rich people, things are much worse when you
take quality-adjusted life expectancy into account, be-
cause the people with the shortest life expectancy are
also the people who suffer the most pain and disability
during their lives. But if you go down this non-welfarist
track you have to face the problem that sometimes «ef-
ficiency» (which now means «health maximisation», not
Pareto optimality) may have to be sacrificed in the in-
terests of equity, or, to be more specific in the present
context, we may have to settle for a reduced level of
population health in order to reduce health inequalities
within that population.
Such trade-off problems are attractive research to-
pics for economists, and with some Spanish colleagues
we recently tested the willingness of a representative
sample of the Spanish population to sacrifice efficiency
in the interest of equity. You may be interested to know
that the median Spaniard out of our sample of about
1200 people is indifferent between the following two si-
tuations.
In other words it is worth sacrificing 2 years life ex-
pectancy for the better off group even though it incre-
ases the life expectancy of the worst off group by only
6 months. At the very least this can be taken as a strong
argument for replacing the welfarist paradigm in eco-
nomics with a non-welfarist one which includes in the
social welfare function both the distribution of welfare
and a coefficient expressing the strength of people’s co-
llective aversion to different sorts of inequality. Doing
so would greatly increase the relevance and accepta-
bility of economic reasoning in a social policy context,
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Expected age at death
Option A Option B
Upper class 77 75
Lower class 72 72.5
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where inequalities are typically a big political issue.
Conclusions
My arrogant conclusion from all of this is that 
Health Economists are now amongst the leaders in a
«paradigm shift» in economics that needs to spread as
quickly as possible into the rest of the subject, and es-
pecially into macro-economics, where the explicit spe-
cification of the relevant social welfare function is cons-
picuous by its absence, and normative judgements about
optimal levels of this and that seem totally untouched
by any systematic elicitation of the values of the popu-
lation affected. Perhaps some of you younger and bra-
ver economists would be prepared to dedicate your pro-
fessional lives to making non-welfarism the norm in eco-
nomics, so that the welfarist position comes to be seen
as a historical curiosity. Policy analysis by economists
should, as a result, become much more closely attu-
ned to the values of the societies we claim to serve, and
the world will be a better place as a result. It is a pity
that I won’t live to see the day but I’ll be watching you
all from somewhere out there. Go to it, it’s a big and
daunting task, but you will need a clear head and a thick
skin. It can be a very hostile environment at times!
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